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NOTES

"Emerging Awareness"
After the Emergence of Roberts:
REASONABLE SOCIETAL RELIANCE IN
SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS INQUIRY
I.

INTRODUCTION

Substantive due process' is under attack.2 Judicially,s
politically, 4 academically, 5 and even socially,6 a coalition of
1 Defined as the practice of the courts, through the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, identifying "a set of personal activities in which individuals may engage
[presumptively] free of government regulation. This list derives from American
constitutional text and tradition ... ." Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The
"FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1897
n.14 (2004) [hereinafter Tribe, The "FundamentalRight"]. Compare JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) ("Substantive
due process' is a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green pastel redness.'"), with 1
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 1333 (3d ed. 2000) ('[Tlhe
phrase that follows 'due process' is 'of law,' and there is a reasonable historical
argument that, by 1868, a recognized meaning of the qualifying phrase 'of law' was
substantive.").
2 See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 943 (1992)
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (lamenting in and
forewarning of the weakening of substantive due process protections: "I am 83 years
old. I cannot remain on this Court forever, and when I do step down, the confirmation
process for my successor well may focus on the issue before us today. That, I regret,
may be exactly where the choice between the two worlds will be made."); Governor
George W. Bush, First Presidential Debate (Oct. 3, 2000), available at
don't
("I
http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2000/debates/transcripts/u221003.html
believe in liberal, activist judges. I believe in-I believe in strict constructionists. And
those are the kind of judges I will appoint.") [hereinafter Bush, Debate].
3 See, e.g., Tribe, The "FundamentalRight," supra note 1, at 1925-26 (noting
"forceful" dissents in Casey).
4 See, e.g., Bush, Debate, supra note 2.
5 See, e.g., ELY, supra note 1, at 18.
6 See, e.g., The Rush Limbaugh Show: Liberalism Implemented by Activist
http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/estack/
(Dec.
1,
2004),
Judges
liberalism implemented-.by-activist-judges.guest.html.
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forces threatens substantive due process arguing against what
it sees as "social legislation" from the bench. 7 A continued
assault is even more likely now that the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the retirement of Justice O'Connor have each
granted President George W. Bush the opportunity to appoint a
new Justice to the Supreme Court.8 Following the emergence
of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito replaced Justice
O'Connor, who was often the swing vote on the Court. 9
Because President Bush has made it no secret that he favors
those of the bench with the least regard for substantive due
process, 10 the Court is likely only to tilt further against the
analysis. 11
But substantive due process is also on the march.12 In
Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court used substantive due
process 13 to hold that state laws cannot forbid private gay
sexual behavior.14 Lawrence was seen as a landmark both for

7 President George H.W. Bush, Teleconference Remarks to the National
Association
of
Hispanic
Journalists
(Apr.
24,
1992),
available
at
http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/papers/1992/92042402.html.
8 See, e.g., Elisabeth Bumiller & Carl Hulse, Bush Picks U.S. Appeals
Judge
to Take O'Connor'sCourt Seat, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 1, 2005, at Al.
9 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Alito Vote May Be Decisive in Marquee Cases This
Term, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 31, 2006, at Al.
10 See Katha Pollitt, Bush's Court Picks: Be Afraid. Very Afraid., THE NATION,
Oct. 7, 2004, available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/20041025/pollitt ("Bush has
said he wants more Justices in the Scalia/Thomas mold."); see also Robert C. Post,
Foreword:Fashioningthe Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 4, 85 (2003) ("Because substantive due process doctrine has historically engaged
in remarkably candid efforts to interpret and apply cultural values, Scalia would
abandon the doctrine altogether, viewing it as an improper 'springboard] for judicial
lawmaking.') (citing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 25, 142-43 (1997)).
11 See Liptak, supra note 9.
12 See Nan D. Hunter, Living with Lawrence, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1118
(2004) ("Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter are moving the Court to a more flexible
analytical structure for evaluating substantive due process claims.").
'3 Justice O'Connor would have preferred the Court reach its holding through
the Equal Protection Clause. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 579 (2003) (O'Connor,
J., concurring). Equal protection values are widely seen as prevalent in the Lawrence
opinion. See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1103 (suggesting Lawrence "weaves together
substantive due process and equal protection doctrine into a holistic analysis of the
cultural weight of the individual rights involved"); Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving
Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1447, 1449 (2004) ("[Lliberty and equality are . . .
intertwined in Lawrence . . . ."); Recent Case, Eleventh Circuit Upholds Alabama
Statute Banning Sale of Sex Toys, 118 HARv. L. REV. 802, 806 (2004) (Lawrence was
"heavily driven by equal protection principles") [hereinafter Recent Case, Eleventh
Circuit Upholds Alabama Statute].
14 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 564, 574-75, 578.
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gay rights and for substantive due process inquiry itself.,,
Shortly thereafter, the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that
under state substantive due process, gays were entitled to the
same marriage rights and protections as heterosexual
couples.16 Seen again as a major victory for gay rights,17 the
Massachusetts court certainly flexed substantive due process. 18
In response to these advances, eleven states passed
constitutional
state
similar
forbidding
amendments
interpretation, 19 Congress passed the so-called "Defense of
Marriage Act,"20 and President Bush forwarded a federal
constitutional amendment defining marriage as between "one
man and one woman."21
In this fray-where arguably the Supreme Court should
united and explicit22--the Court's explanation and
its
most
be
15 See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1137 ("Lawrence is a breakthrough.");
Edward Stein, Introducing Lawrence v. Texas: Some Background and a Glimpse of the
Future, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 263, 288 (2004) ("Lawrence is clearly a landmark
decision for lesbian and gay rights.... ."); Tribe, The "FundamentalRight," supra note

1, at 1895 (Lawrence is a "watershed decision"); but cf Cass R. Sunstein, What Did
Lawrence Hold? OfAutonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and Marriage, 2003 SUP. CT. REV.
27, 31 (2003) ("The decision was possible only because of the ludicrously poor fit
between the sodomy prohibition and the society in which the justices live. And if I am
correct, Lawrence will have broad implications only if and to the extent that those
broad implications receive general public support.") [hereinafter Sunstein, What Did
Lawrence Hold?].

16 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (citing
state equal protection principles as well).
17 See, e.g., William C. Duncan, The Litigation to Redefine Marriage:Equality

and Social Meaning, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623, 636-42 (2004); Brenda Feigen, Same-Sex
Marriage:An Issue of ConstitutionalRights Not Moral Opinions, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 345 (2004); Kara S. Suffredini & Madeleine V. Findley, Speak Now: Progressive
Considerationson the Advent of Civil Marriage for Same-Sex Couples, 45 B.C. L. REV.

595 (2004).
is See Feigen, supra note 17, at 345 (describing Goodridge as a "revolutionary
case").
19 Thomas Roberts & Sean Gibbons, Same-Sex Marriage Bans Winning on
State Ballots: 11 States Approve Constitutional Amendments to Outlaw Gay Nuptials,

http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/11/02/
2004,
3,
Nov.
CNN,
ballot.samesex.marriage/.
20 Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C.
§ 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000)) (defining marriage exclusively as "a legal union between
one man and one woman as husband and wife"); see Adrienne Butcher, Note, Selective
Constitutional Analysis in Lawrence v. Texas: An Exercise in Judicial Restraint or a
Willingness to Reconsider Equal Protection Classificationfor Homosexuals?, 41 HOUS.

L. REV. 1407, 1409 (2004).
21 Press Release, The White House: President George W. Bush, President
Calls

for

Constitutional Amendment

Protecting Marriage, Feb.

24,

2004,

http'//www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040224-2.html.
22 Unanimity and clarity are widely seen as critical to the legitimacy and
effectiveness of some of the Court's landmark rulings. See, e.g., Ken Garten, A
Landmark Decision Marks its 50th Anniversary, THE EXAMINER (E. Jackson County,
Mo.), May 10, 2004, available at http://www.examiner.net/stories/051004/
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implementation of substantive due process has been divided23
and ambiguous.- For example, in Lawrence v. Texas the Court
seemed to depart from its longstanding two-tiered2 analysis.26
Consequentially, lower courts have shown confusion in
applying Lawrence.27
To withstand the barrage and to secure its
constitutional footing, this Note suggests those who see value

ken_051004006.shtml ("Chief Justice Warren also knew that unanimity was critical to
the social importance of the Court's action in Brown in declaring segregation
unconstitutional."); Alain A. Levasseur, Legitimacy of Judges, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 43, 81
(2002) ("The 'Warren Court' in the landmark case of Brown v. Board of Education, was
very explicit as to the method of interpretation that it should adopt to address the
emotional and highly divisive problem of segregation in public education.") (internal
citation omitted).
23 See, e.g., Christopher P. Banks, The Constitutional Politics of Interpreting
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 36 AKRON L. REV. 425, 471 (2003) (noting the
.shifting coalitions of a divided (often five-to-four) Rehnquist Court").
24 See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 12, at 1103 ("The Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence v. Texas is easy to read, but difficult to pin down.') (internal citation
omitted); Sunstein, What did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 29, 45 (describing
Lawrence as a "remarkably opaque opinion" that "raises a number of puzzles"); but cf
Karlan, supra note 13, at 1449 ("Like Loving, Lawrence marks a crystallization of
doctrine.").
21 See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
("There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality
when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the
Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally
specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth."); see also infra Part III.A.
26 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) ('Their right to liberty
under the Due Process Clause gives [homosexuals] the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government ....
The Texas statute furthers no
legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private
life of the individual."); Karlan, supra note 13, at 1450 (suggesting Lawrence
'undermines the traditional tiers of scrutiny altogether"); Calvin Massey, The New
Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 946 (2004)
("Nevertheless, it is not too soon to declare that the combined effect of the methods
employed by the Court in Lawrence and Grutter has done serious damage to the health
of tiered scrutiny [which may be] beginning to collapse."); Sunstein, What Did
Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 48 ("An alternative reading is that the Court
deliberately refused to specify its 'tier' of analysis because it was rejecting the idea of
tiers altogether."); but cf Hunter, supra note 12, at 1117 ("In both Casey and Lawrence,
the Court eschewed direct use of fundamental rights language, but made clear that the
rights being compared were equivalent and therefore entitled, by whatever standard of
review, to equivalent protection."); Tribe, The "FundamentalRight," supra note 1, at
1917 ("In any event, the strictness of the Court's standard in Lawrence, however
articulated, could hardly have been more obvious."); also cf. Jeffrey Goehring, Note,
Lawrence v. Texas: Dignity, A New Standard for Substantive Rational Basis Review?,
13 LAw & SEX. 727, 727 (2004) (arguing the Lawrence Court used "rational basis
review").
" Compare Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004)
(finding Lawrence did not demand a right to private use of sexual devices), with
Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (finding Lawrence did demand
a right to private use of sexual devices); see generally infra Part V.
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in substantive due process 28 should supplement its past
justifications.29 Inquiry into reasonable societal reliance-that
is, judicial appreciation of the practices citizens have developed
a real and rational trust in the protected nature op°--can help
in this goal. 31 This Note argues that reasonable societal
reliance underlies substantive due process's foundations, its
prior 3 2 and current jurisprudence, 33 and should be explicitly
announced as a vital aspect of continued substantive due
process review.- 4 In other words-to borrow from due process's
classic phrasing-an "emerging awareness" 35 should be capable
of "so root[ing] in the traditions and conscience of our people"
that its predicate practice will be "ranked as fundamental" and
36
therefore protected.
Part II will briefly review and analyze the arguments
surrounding proper constitutional interpretation in the
substantive due process context. Part III will trace the history
of substantive due process in relation to its consideration of
reasonable societal reliance. Part IV will demonstrate how
societal reliance inquiry is applied in the Court's recent cases of

28 See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 763 (1997) (Souter, J.,
concurring) ("[Substantive due process's] enduring tradition of American constitutional
practice is, in Justice Harlan's view, nothing more than what is required by the judicial
authority and obligation to construe constitutional text and review legislation for
conformity to that text. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803).").
29 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 588 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(ridiculing past justifications for substantive due process holdings as meaningless
"sweet-mystery-of-life passage[s]" that "cast[] some doubt' upon either the totality of
our jurisprudence or else (presumably the right answer) nothing at all") (internal
citation omitted).
" Post, supra note 10, at 11 ("[Jludicial authority might best be reconceived
as a relationship of trust that courts forge with the American people. Constitutional
law is not the ground of this relationship, but rather its consequence.").
31 In another sense, another modest goal of this note is to add, in whatever
way possible, to the growing debate surrounding the forecasted "new methodology" or
"new vision" for substantive due process. See Massey, supra note 26, at 946-47.

32 See infra Part III.
33 See infra Part IV.
34 See Post, supra note 10, at 8 ("[The Court in fact commonly constructs

constitutional law in the context of an ongoing dialogue with culture, so that culture is
inevitably (and properly) incorporated into the warp and woof of constitutional law.").
35 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003) ("[W]e think that our laws
and traditions in the past half century... show an emerging awareness that liberty
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private
lives in matters pertaining to sex.").
36 See Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) (describing
substantive due process analysis as inquiry into those practices which have "so rooted
in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental"); see also
infra Part III.A.
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Through

discussion of the Eleventh Circuit's handling of Willams v.
Attorney General of Alabama,39 Part V will highlight how lower
courts are struggling with Glucksberg and Lawrence and argue
that these recent precedents are best read as pointing to an
appreciation of societal reliance in substantive due process
inquiry. Part VI will conclude with a summary of how
sensitivity towards reasonable societal reliance is an effective if
not necessary strategy to safeguard substantive due process.
II.

CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND SUBSTANTIVE

DUE PROCESS
The
hottest
controversies
in
constitutional
interpretation arise when the courts, often through substantive
due process inquiry, breach the so-called "culture wars."4° A
substantive due process inquiry centered on reasonable societal
reliances would help ease the rifts that result.
A.

The CurrentDebate

The current debate over substantive due process volleys
between whether a strong jurisprudence would be either
integral or antithetical to proper constitutional interpretation.'1
Supporters of a strong substantive due process believe in its
power to end national divides while those in opposition see the
same as ultimately divisive. 42
37

521 U.S. 702 (1997).

38 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
39 378 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).

' Compare Post, supra note 10, at 10 ("[C]onstitutional law will [continue
being] as dynamic and as contested as the cultural values and beliefs that inevitably
form part of the substance of constitutional law. Unless the Court were to cease
protecting constitutional values altogether, it cannot avoid entanglement in the
'culture wars' that sometimes sweep the country."), with Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,
652 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("I think it no business of the courts (as opposed to
the political branches) to take sides in this culture war.").
41 See generally Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original
Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original
Intentions in ConstitutionalAdjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U.

L. REV. 226 (1988); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849
(1989); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Doff, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 U. Cmi. L. REV. 1057 (1990); Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781
(1983).
42 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Lawrence's Jurisprudenceof Tolerance: Judicial
Review to Lower the Stakes of Identity Politics, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1021, 1078 (2004)

("The domestication of culture clashes is important in maintaining the advantages of
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The main argument for a strong substantive due process
is that in interpreting the Constitution, which was written in
abstract and indeterminate language, the courts must, through
an evolutionary process, forcefully articulate and preserve
America's fundamental social and moral values.4 Others have
expressed similar conceptualizations through the idea of
"translating" the liberties at the time of our framing into
applicable rulings for the modern context.- For example, just
as the First Amendment's freedom of the "press" should be
translated to include freedom of broadcast television (even
though our eighteenth-century "Constitution doesn't speak
much about televisions"), 45 other freedoms should be translated
into the modern era through the Due Process Clause. As
Justice Harlan explained, "the full scope of the liberty
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause cannot be found in or
limited by the precise terms of the specific guarantees
elsewhere provided in the Constitution."Inevitably, those opposed to such a method of
constitutional interpretation retort that too much power then
rests with the "subjective considerations" of the individual
Justices. 47 Complaints about the elitist, anti-democratic nature
of the interpretation follow.- Subsequently, those skeptical of
political pluralism-moderation, stability, and the peaceful resolution of disputes.
Judicial review helps social groups avoid mutually destructive Games of Chicken. This
is a big boon for the modern regulatory state.").
4 See Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term, Foreword: The

Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 47 (1989) ("Ultimately, constitutional
law is a matter of defining and protecting society's most cherished values."); id. at 102
("The Court provides content to the Constitution by applying the text's abstract values
to concrete, modem problems.").
4

See Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity and Constraint, 65 FORDHAM L. REv. 1365,

1376-84 (1997); Tushnet, supra note 41, at 804-24.
45 Lessig, supra note 44, at 1376.
46

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

47 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting);

see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 (1997) ("This approach tends to
rein in the subjective elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial
review.").
" Compare Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) ("[Tihis outcome... has been arrived at by... a democratic vote by nine
lawyers, not on the question whether the text of the Constitution has anything to say
about this subject."), and Griswold, 381 U.S. at 526-27 (Black, J., dissenting) ("The late
Judge Learned Hand . . .made the statement, with which I fully agree, that: 'For
myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians, even if I
knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do not."'), with Post, supra note 10, at 6
("[Jiudges ...do not function as 'a small group of fortunately situated people with a
roving commission to second-guess Congress [and] state legislatures . . .concerning
what is best for the country.' Instead they exercise the authority that has been
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the appropriateness or ability of the Court to keep the
Constitution "in tune with the times" 49 cite the people's
conspicuous power to amend it. Other criticisms of a broad
substantive due process include that the Court disrespects the
Constitution when it reads too much into it, the Court has
become too political without sufficient political checks, and the
Court, in moving too far beyond the text of the Constitution,
5
has become too unstable. 0
There is also the argument that the Court should isolate
some issues from the democratic arena in order to end
cancerous factions and preserve national unity. 51 The classic
exemplar of this is when Justice O'Connor pushed Roe v. Wade
to have "call[ed] the contending sides of a national controversy
to end their national division by accepting a common mandate
rooted in the Constitution."52 While this prospect may appear
entirely undemocratic and therefore immediately repulsive, it
is worth remembering that the Constitution was principled
upon protecting minority rights and practices, even from
53
majoritarian impulses.
However, in response to Justice O'Connor's appeal to
end a national division with a constitutionally mandated
ruling, Justice Scalia easily rejoined twenty-seven years after

assigned them to pronounce the law of the Constitution.") (quoting William H.
Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REV. 693, 698 (1976)).
49 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting); see also Eskridge, supra
note 42, at 1042 (stating the "Lawrence dissenters objected that shifting regimes to
require tolerance of a previously despised minority group is a political judgment that
should be left to the legislature" or to "'We the People' acting through an amendment to
the Constitution."); Hunter, supra note 12, at 1104 ("In my view, the Lawrence opinion
is in perfect tune with its times, articulating a new principle of equal liberty and
resonating with a neoliberal political vision of civil rights.").
50 See Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1043 ("This classic jurisprudence of original
intent is inspired by many worthy values, including the rule of law, democracy, and
deliberation. If judges follow an objectively determinable original meaning, they are
imbuing constitutional law with the rule of law values of objectivity, transparency, and
predictability."); see also Massey, supra note 26, at 946 (noting Lawrence has produced
"instability").
51 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), in GEOFFREY R. STONE, ET
AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (4th ed., 2001) [hereinafter FEDERALIST NO. 10]; see also
Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1078 ("Activist (but not too activist) judicial review can help
domesticate culture clashes. By requiring each group in [the] culture clash to tone
down its denigrating rhetoric, judicial review domesticates their conflict insofar as it
occurs in the political arena.").
52 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 867 (1992).
53 FEDERALIST NO. 10; see Chemerinsky, supra note 43, at 47 ("Abandoning
the [Rehnquist Court's] search for value neutrality and the strong presumption for
majoritarianism has the potential to improve significantly both the theory and practice
of constitutional law.").
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Roe 54 that abortion remained one of the "most contentious and
" 5
controversial [issues] in contemporary American society. 6
Justice Scalia continued, "for the sake of its own preservation,
the Court should return this matter to the people."56
Conversely to Justice O'Connor's view, Justice Scalia believed
that the Court's intervention "fan[si" or "inflame [s]"57
controversies, not helps to "end"58 them.
In the end, because those who attack substantive due
process are arguably ascendant, 59 those who see value in
substantive due process must supplement their response. 60
Inquiry into reasonable societal reliance helps fill that role.61
Unabated, the criticism of substantive due process will only
grow until some of its most cherished and important holdings
are thrown into jeopardy. 62
B.

Explanation of Reasonable Societal Reliance Inquiry

A substantive due process inquiry centered on current
reasonable societal reliances would protect those who have
objectively sound trust in the ability to continue their
questioned practice.63 Judges would look to the reasonableness
of this trust to determine whether protection is appropriate,
and to what degree.6 Substantive due process jurisprudence
would more mirror, it could be said, the two-part procedural
due process inquiry announced in Mathews v. Eldridge-u and
furthered by Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.In Mathews, the Court held a plaintiff had received
sufficient process before the state discontinued his disability
14

See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113

(1973).
55

Carhart,530 U.S. at 956 (Scalia, J., dissenting).

56

Id.

Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 995).
58 Casey, 505 U.S. at 867.
9 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
o See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
61 See infra Part II.B.
62 See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 955 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
17

("Casey must be overruled."); but cf Hunter, supra note 12, at 1123 (arguing the
"current line of privacy cases will remain essentially undisturbed").
63 See Post, supra note 10, at 11 ("[Jludicial authority might best be
reconceived as a relationship of trust that courts forge with the American people.
Constitutional law is not the ground of this relationship, but rather its consequence.").
64 See id.
65 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
66 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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benefits.67
In Loudermill the Court found a state
inappropriately fired a security guard.6 In both cases, the
state defined the property at question-the right to continue
receiving one's disability benefits and the right to continue at
one's employment-as what had been subject to reliance under
the existing "rules and understanding."69 That is, the existing
norms in Loudermill's state would determine whether it was
reasonable for him to rely on his continued employment as a
security guard. 70 If it were, the courts would then determine
whether the process in withholding that property was due, i.e.
was there a sufficient opportunity for Loudermill to be heard
before being fired.71
A substantive due process sensitive to reasonable
societal reliances would borrow from this approach. 72 It would
look to the existing rules and understanding to determine
whether the plaintiff could objectively rely on continuing the
questioned practice. If so, the Court would determine the
degree of protection deserved. 73
Such an inquiry into reasonable societal reliance is not
wholly alien to substantive due process analysis. In dissent,
Justice Harlan had spoken of an inquiry
having regard to what history teaches are the traditions from which
[this country] developed as well as the traditions from which it
broke. That tradition is a living thing. A decision of this Court
which radically departs from it could not long survive, while a
74
decision which builds on what has survived is likely to be sound.

Mathews, 424 U.S. at 349.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547-48.
69 Id. at 538 ("Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their
having had a property right in continued employment. If they did, the State could not
deprive them of this property without due process.") (internal citation omitted).
67

68

70

Id.

71

Id. at 541.

72 As well as procedural due process, a substantive due process inquiry

centered on reasonable societal reliances could derive from several other
jurisprudential parents. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967)
(Harlan, J., concurring) (instilling an inquiry into reasonable expectations of privacy
into Fourth Amendment jurisprudence); Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 402
(1922) (instilling an inquiry into reasonable investment-backed expectations into
Takings Clause jurisprudence).
73 See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 28, (arguing
"Lawrence had a great deal to do with procedural due process, rather than the clause's
substantive sibling").
71 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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is

uncertain. 75
Importantly, it articulated two fundamental
principles for a substantive due process inquiry respectful of
reasonable societal reliance. First, it conceived of an inquiry
that necessarily departed from the time of the framing.76
Second, it explicitly recognized the evolutionary process of
American
traditions. 77
Moreover,
Justice
Harlan's
conceptualization implicitly called for an evolutionary theory of
constitutional interpretation that can equally evolve to
7
coherently ensure foundational principles of liberty endure. 1
But a substantive due process inquiry based upon reasonable
societal reliances goes further; it permits an objective
assessment of the developed or developing traditions in order to
oblige due process protection. 79

III.

REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND

FOUNDATIONAL HOLDINGS OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE
PROCESS

Substantive due process analysis has drawn from
inquiry into reasonable societal reliances throughout its
history. While this Note argues that there is a consistency in

" The formulation was interestingly unmentioned in any Lawrence opinion.
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 756 n.4 (1997) (Souter, J., concurring) ("The status of the Harlan dissent in
Poe v. Ullman is shown by the Court's adoption of its result in Griswold v. Connecticut,

and by the Court's acknowledgment of its status and adoption of its reasoning in
Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.") (internal citations omitted); Moore

v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977) (plurality opinion) (opinion for four
Justices treating Justice Harlan's Poe dissent as a central explication of the
methodology of judicial review under the Due Process Clause); Hunter, supra note 12,
at 1121 ("The fullest explication of an alternative position, now largely adopted
through Lawrence, came in Justice Souter's concurring opinion in Glucksberg. Justice
Souter drew extensively from Justice Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman.") (internal
citations omitted).
76 Poe, 367 U.S. at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing the Court must not
"radically depart" from tradition which is a "living thing").
77 Id.
78 See id.; see also Post, supra note 10, at 8 ("[Llaw and culture are locked in a
dialectical relationship, so that constitutional law both arises from and in turn
regulates culture.").
7' This is similar to the objective way procedural due process defines
property. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text; see also Glucksberg, 521 U.S.
at 720-21 (emphasizing the requirement of some objectivity: "First, we have regularly
observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and
liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.")
(internal citation omitted); Post, supra note 10, at 91-92.
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substantive due process inquiry, it is helpful to divide the
Supreme Court's cases between those focused on "tradition"
and those focused on "personal dignity and autonomy." s° This
Note's analysis of the case history of substantive due process
follows such a division.
A.

TraditionalSubstantive Due Process Inquiry and
Reasonable Societal Reliance

Traditional substantive due process analysis holds that
a legislature may not impair "fundamental" practices, which
are "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people,"8 1
barring "narrowly tailored" action to promote a "compelling
state interest." 2 Otherwise, a legislature would only need a
"rational relation" to a "legitimate state interest" to act.
The
debate over this analysis, as previously discussed, volleys
between whether these "traditions" must have been "so rooted"
at the time of our framing or whether they could have since
taken root-so to speak-in the interim.- Even those arguing
the former, however, implicitly recognize that there are certain
rights, a list of which cannot be definitively numbered, 8 not
mentioned in the four corners of the Constitution,6 that the
courts have and should still protect. 87 Equivalent to-if not
even more precise than-these "traditions" are the practices
80 See Post, supra note 10 at 89 ("[Ihe Court ha[s] adopted two distinct
approaches to defining ... substantive due process. The first, which I shall call the
traditional approach, focuse Is] on a hermeneutics of history and tradition; the second,
which I shall call the autonomy approach, focuse Is] on the forms of liberty prerequisite
for personal dignity and autonomy.") (internal citation omitted).
8' Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
82 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Reno v. Flores,
507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
83 See id. at 735.
84 See supra notes 43-50 and accompanying text.
85 See Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 8 (1988) (observing "Art. III's
proscription against advisory opinions"); see also Tribe, The "FundamentalRight,"
supra note 1, at 1899 ("[Lawrence] treated . . . substantive due process . . . not as a
record of the inclusion of various activities in-and the exclusion of other activities
from-a fixed list defined by tradition, but as reflections of a deeper pattern involving
the allocation of decisionmaking roles . . ").
86 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 87 (1987) (protecting adult
heterosexual marriage through the Due Process Clause); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (using the Equal Protection Clause to strike down state laws forbidding
interracial marriage).
87 For example, even Justice Scalia, the member of the Court with perhaps
the least affection for a strong substantive due process inquiry, has upheld its use in
protecting the "fundatmental" right of heterosexual adults to marry. See Turner, 482
U.S. at 78 (Scalia, J., joining the Court's majority).
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which at the framing carried with them reasonable societal
reliance. 88

An example of traditional substantive due process
inquiry can be found in the Court's heterosexual marriage
cases.
In Zablocki v. Redhail the Court invalidated a
Wisconsin law forbidding a marriage if a court determined the
89
groom would be unable to pay previously owed child support.
Similarly, in Turner v. Safley the Court unanimously struck
down a prison regulation forbidding inmates from marrying
unless the superintendent of the prison found a compelling
reason to grant permission.- In both cases, the Court, though
through different words, found the tradition of heterosexual
marriage had "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people" that it required protection.91
The Court thereby
demanded the adverse legislation be sufficiently tailored to a
compelling state interest; a bar the state failed to meet in both
cases.92

By finding that marriage restrictions were not

reasonably related to legitimate state interests, the Court in
both Turner and Zabloki could be read as having found that it
was reasonable for a couple to rely on the right to marry, and
not for a state to rely on its right to forbid9 3 In such a way,
substantive due process inquiry has always carried with it a
4
degree of analysis into reasonable societal reliances9
B.

Selected Substantive Due Process Decisionson Assorted
Traditions

In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court invalidated a state law
prohibiting teaching in a non-English language in state
88 A precise definition of the right questioned has been seen as vital to those
opposed to the extension of substantive due process protections. See Williams v. Att'y
Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2004) (upholding a statute against sexualdevices: "First, in analyzing a request for recognition of a new fundamental right, or
extension of an existing one, we 'must begin with a careful description of the asserted
right.'") (internal citation omitted); see also Post, supra note 10, at 91-92; but cf
Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1048 (arguing "one can get whatever answer one wants by
how one poses the question" of the right involved).
89 Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382 (1978).
90 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 91 (1987).
91 Id.; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 382.
92 Turner, 482 U.S. at 91; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 382; see also Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993)).
93 See Turner, 482 U.S. at 91; Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 382.
9
See Post, supra note 10, at 11 ("The Court must maintain the distinctly
legal authority of constitutional law, and yet it must also embed constitutional law
within the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors.").
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schools. 95 The Court refused to attempt "to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed" by the Due Process
Clause.96 The Court did, however, note that "[wiithout doubt"
protections were afforded to "the common occupations of life" as
well as "those privileges long recognized at common law as
97
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free" persons.
In 1923-the year Meyer was decided-and before, significant
numbers of children were being educated in foreign
languages. 9 8 The practice was particularly widespread in
Nebraska where over ten percent of the population was foreignborn in 1910, five percent born in Germany alone. 99 With vast
numbers enjoying a certain practice, the Court refused to find
such reliance unprotected. The reasonableness of the societal
reliance in the liberty to teach one's child in a non-English
language guided the Court to shield that "common occupation[]
of life" from hostile legislation. 100
Shortly thereafter, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the
Court invalidated an Oregon law forbidding children from
attending non-public schools.101 Here, the Court even began
noting the numbers of those who relied upon the practice the
legislation challenged. That is, the Court noted an average of
"one hundred" annually enrolled in religious schools.102 As with
teaching in foreign languages in Meyer, attending non-public
schools was reasonably relied upon in Society of Sisters. In
fact, around ten percent0 - of the population attended nonpublic schools at the time. 4 With so many relying on the
" Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
96 Id. at 399.
97

Id.

See Nebraska District of Evangelical Lutheran Synod v. McKelvie, 175
N.W. 531, 533 (Neb. 1919).
9 See Stephen E. Sachs, Turning Aliens into Citizens: Americanization and
the Foreign Language Laws (Jan. 12, 2001) (unpublished Seminar Paper, Yale Law
(noting
that
School),
http://www.stevesachs.comlpapers/paper_98a.html
Americanization of these immigrants was a particular target of the legislation).
Statistics of foreign births in 1910 are appropriate for the Supreme Court decision of
1923 due to the time lags between a child's birth and her formal education and between
a conflict's initial adjudication and Supreme Court review.
'0o Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399-400.
1' Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 536 (1925).
102 Id. at 532-33.
103 This is a similar percentage to those foreign-born in Nebraska in the 1920's
98

and thereby targeted by the Americanizing legislation the Court ruled unconstitutional
in Meyer v. Nebraska. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
104 NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARD ASSOCIATION, A COMPARISON: THE ROLE OF
PRIVATE SCHOOLS, http'//www.nsba.org/sitesec-peac.asp?CID=1235&DID=32916 (last
visited Apr. 4, 2006).
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practice, with it "common" and "long recognized,"1,5 substantive
due process protection soon followed.
Continuing, in Moore v. East Cleveland, the Court, in
1971, invalidated a city ordinance limiting those living together
to only "family" members. 10 6 The questioned ordinance, as
defined, precluded a woman from living with her son and her
The Court cited
two grandchildren-who were cousins.107
scholarly work and newspaper accounts concerning the practice
of households expanding beyond the classic nuclear family. 1°
The Court even went into specific census reports to analyze the
prevalence of the behavior:
Recent census reports bear out the importance of family patterns
other than the prototypical nuclear family. In 1970, 26.5% of all
families contained one or more members over 18 years of age, other
U.S. Department of
than the head of household and spouse.
Commerce, 1970 Census of Population, vol. 1, pt. 1, Table 208. In
U.S. Department of
1960 the comparable figure was 26.1%.
Commerce, 1960 Census of Population, vol. 1, pt. 1, Table 187.
Earlier data are not available. 109

The Court's investigation led it to determine that
reliance on being able to live with those outside one's
immediate family was reasonable.11° This conclusion then
directed the Court to protect the practice. 111 Implicitly, thereby,
the Court recognized that substantive due process inquiry
includes sensitivity towards reasonable societal reliance.
Because a practice was objectively reasonably relied upon, the
Court determined protection was appropriate.112

105 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.

431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977).
Id. at 495-97.
108 Id. at 504 n.14 (citing BETTY G. YORBURG, THE CHANGING FAMILY (1973);
Urie Bronfenbrenner, The Calamitous Decline of the American Family, WASH. POST,
Jan. 2, 1977, at Cl).
109 Moore, 431 U.S. at 504 n.14.
110 Id. at 506; see also id. at 510 n.9 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("It is estimated
106
107

that at least 26% of black children live in other than husband-wife families, 'including
foster parents, the presence of other male or female relatives (grandfather or
grandmother, older brother or sister, uncle or aunt), male or female nonrelatives, [or
with] only one adult (usually mother) present .... ") (internal citation omitted).

...Id. at 506.
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1993) (emphasizing
the requirement of some objectivity: "First, we have regularly observed that the Due
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.'") (internal citation
omitted); see also Post, supra note 10, at 91-92.
112
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In Meyer, Pierce, and Moore, traditions of liberty in the
education of one's children and in the definition of one's
household instigated plaintiffs to defend their relied upon
expectations., 13 Because such reliance was reasonable, the
Supreme Court honored those expectations.14
C.

Selected Substantive Due ProcessDecisions on the
Tradition of Autonomy

Supreme Court precedents dealing with the issues of
contraception and abortion have also demonstrated how
reasonable societal reliance has been a continuous part of the
In Griswold v.
Court's substantive due process inquiry.
Connecticut, the Court, in 1965, invalidated a state statute
prohibiting the distribution of contraceptives.115 With millions
of American women already using "the Pill," reasonable
reliance on the contraceptive was clearly widespread. 116 While
the Griswold majority failed to mention the underlying fact
that contraceptives were widely available regardless of the
Connecticut statute, Justice White, in concurrence, finally
stated the obvious: "[T]heir availability in that State is not
seriously disputed."117 In fact, around ten percent of premenopausal women were using the Pill in 1965.11 In Griswold,
the Court again found a reasonably relied upon practice

113 Moore, 431 U.S. at 494; Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 510 (1925);

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
114 Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403; Pierce, 268 U.S. at 536; Moore, 431 U.S. at 506.
115 381 U.S. 479, 479 (1965).
116 See Evolution and Revolution: The Past, Present, and Future of
2000),
6
(Feb.
REP.
THE
CONTRACEPTION
10
Contraception,
("Use of oral
http://www.contraceptiononline.org/contrareport/article0l.cfn?art=93
contraceptives grew rapidly. Within a year of their introduction, OCs were the method
of choice for more than 400,000 US women. This number tripled the following year.
By 1965, 3.8 million US women were using the pill."); PBS.org, Timeline: The Pill,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/pill/timeline/timeline2.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2005)
[hereinafter Timeline: The Pill] ("[In 1965 jlust five years after the Pill's FDA approval,
more than 6.5 million American woman are taking oral contraceptives, making the Pill
the most popular form of birth control in the U.S."); see also Sunstein, What Did
Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 28 ("In Griswold, it will be recalled, the Court
invalidated a Connecticut law forbidding married people to use contraceptives-a law
that was ludicrously inconsistent with public convictions in Connecticut and
throughout the nation.").
1" Griswold, 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring).
1 See Timeline: The Pill, supra note 116; Nationmaster.com, North America:
http://www.nationmaster.com/country/us/
Age
Distribution,
United
States:
Agedistribution (last visited Apr. 10, 2005) [hereinafter United States: Age
Distribution].
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protected. 1' 9 In later substantive due process cases, the Court
would strengthen their inquiry into reasonable societal
reliances.
Adjudicating a case from Texas, the Court in Roe v.
Wade in 1973 announced constitutional protections concerning
the fundamental right of having access to an abortion.120 In
1972, over 500,000 women received legal abortions.121 That
number was rising steadily by the year.1 22 While the Court
could not reach its holding in Roe through reasonable societal
reliance alone, the Court did nevertheless note, "[iun the past
several years ... a trend toward liberalization of abortion
statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third of the
States, of less stringent laws [impeding access to an abortion],

most of them patterned after the ALI Model Penal Code

....

"123

Recognition of this rising tide of societal reliance was therefore
explicit in the Court's consideration.'24 This direction towards
an emerging societal reliance, after all, included not only a
virulent women's movement 125 but also 17,300 women in Texas
alone waiting to obtain a legal abortion the year Roe was

decided. 126
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the Court developed a
pre-viability "undue burden" test to address abortion
protocols.27 In doing so, the Court used stare decisis to bring
societal reliance principles directly into substantive due
119 See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 27 ("My
principal suggestion here is that the Court's remarkable decision in Lawrence v. Texas
is best seen as a successor to Griswold v. Connecticut:judicial invalidation of a law that
had become hopelessly out of touch with existing social convictions.") (internal citations
omitted).
120
121

410 U.S. 113, 114 (1973).
LISA M. KOoNIN ET AL.,

SURVEILLANCE-UNITED

STATES

1997

CENTER FOR DISEASE

(2000),

CONTROL,

ABORTION

http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/

mmwrhtml/ss4804al.htm.
122 Id.
123 Roe, 410 U.S. at 139-40 (referring to the ALI Model Penal Code, § 230.3).
124 Id.; but cf Post, supra note 10, at 88 ("Roe used substantive due process to
protect a liberty interest that the Court believed was constitutionally valuable, even if
that interest was not immanent in the history and tradition of the nation.").
125 See Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1026 ("The Supreme Court is responsive to
the constitutional politics of social movements."); see generally Elizabeth M. Schneider,
The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986).
126

See ROBERT JOHNSTON, HISTORICAL ABORTION STATISTICS, TEXAS (USA),

http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/abortion/usa/ab-usa-tx.html

(last visited March

2, 2006); THE ALAN GuTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TRENDS IN ABORTION IN TEXAS: 1973-2000

(Jan. 2003), http://www.agi-usa.org/presentations/state-ab-pt/texas.pdf.
127 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
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process analysis.Justice O'Connor noted that "[an entire
generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of
liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society."129
In other words, an entire generation reasonably relied upon
Roe and this reasonable societal reliance compelled the Court
to again protect abortion.130 In 1992, two percent of women
between the ages of 15 and 44 were annually having
abortions.131
Expounding on this understanding, Justice
O'Connor stated, "for two decades of economic and social
developments, people have organized intimate relationships
and made choices that define their views of themselves and
their places in society, in reliance on the availability of abortion

in the event that contraception should

fail."132

Even Chief

Justice Rehnquist in dissent resigned to center his argument
on reliance. He argued that failing to submit "any evidence to
prove any true reliance, the joint opinion's argument is based
solely on generalized assertions ...that the people of this
country have grown accustomed to the Roe decision over the
last 19 years and have 'ordered their thinking and living
around' it." 13 In Casey, both the plurality and dissent focused
on reasonable societal reliance in their substantive due process
inquiry.
In sum, inquiries into reasonable societal reliance
persist in the foundations and history of the Court's
substantive due process analysis.Mounting and consistent,
these inquiries runs throughout the decisions. 135 This history
lays a solid foundation from which the Court's recent decisions
are best read as extending and solidifying substantive due
process's sensitivity towards societal reliance.136

128

Id. at 845-46. Justice Stevens admitted that societal reliance on the ability

to obtain an abortion was unquestionable in 1992 with "more than a million abortions
each year." Id. at 914-915 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See
also Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 44.
'29 Casey, 505 U.S. at 860.
130 Id.
131 LISA M. KOONIN ET AL., CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL, ABORTION
SURVEILLANCE-UNITED STATES, 1996 (1999), http'/www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/
mmwrhtml/ss4804al.htm [hereinafter CDC, SURVEILLANCE 1996].
132 Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (emphasis added).
133 Id. at 957 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (internal citation
omitted).
134

13
131

See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B & C.
See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 27 ("[M]embers

of the Supreme Court live in society, and they are inevitably influenced by what society
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Washington v. Glucksberg137 and Lawrence v. Texas 138
are two recent and important substantive due process cases.
Many scholars have debated the extent and methodology of
their holdings.19 Both cases, however, are best read when
understood to further substantive due process's inquiry into
reasonable societal reliance.1
A.

Washington v. Glucksberg

In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Supreme Court held
one does not have a fundamental right to physician assisted
suicide. 141 In doing so, the Supreme Court reversed the en banc
Ninth Circuit. 142 That circuit had found constitutional due
process protections for those seeking physician assisted suicide
through its analysis of "historical" as well as "current societal
attitudes"-which could very arguably be read as reasonable
societal reliances. - Following the circuit court in its approach
if not its holding, the Supreme Court through Chief Justice
Rehnquist stated, "[wie begin, as we do in all due-process cases,
by examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices. In almost every State-indeed, in almost every
western democracy-it is a crime to assist a suicide."'- Chief
Justice Rehnquist dropped a footnote after the last sentence
where six out of six citations discussed current practices and
not solely the historical conventions of the eighteenth

appears to think.") (citing Robert Dahl, Decision-Makingin a Democracy: The Supreme
Court as a NationalPolicy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279 (1957)).
137 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
138 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
139 See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, Is Lawrence Libertarian?,88 MINN. L. REv. 1140
(2004); Eskridge, supra note 42; Hunter, supra note 12; Karlan, supra note 13; Massey,
supra note 26; Post, supra note 10; Stein, supra note 15; Sunstein, What Did Lawrence
Hold?, supra note 15; Tribe, The "FundamentalRight," supra note 1.
141 See Post, supra note 10, at 8 ("Properly read .. .Lawrence .. .reveals a
Court that defines the substance of constitutional law in the context of the beliefs and
values of nonjudicial actors.").
141 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 702.
142 Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 798 (1996).
143 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 708.
144 Id. at 710 (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted).
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century.145 When Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote "practices" he
was referring to "contemporary practices."146
In other words, substantive due process inquiry begins
with both analysis of history and contemporary "practices"-or
"societal attitudes" as the Ninth Circuit would articulate. 147
When Chief Justice Rehnquist inquired whether the right to
physician assisted suicide had "any place in our Nation's
traditions," he looked to both "centuries of legal doctrine" and
to the current "policy choice of almost every State." 14 The term
"practices," if not referring to "contemporary practices," would
be superfluous, adding nothing to the term "history" in
statements such as "[olur Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices thus provide the crucial 'guideposts for responsible

decisionmaking ....'"149 Chief Justice Rehnquist also stated,
"[tihe history of the law's treatment of assisted suicide in this
country has been and continues to be one of the rejection of
nearly all efforts to permit it."150 Clearly the Chief Justice was
concerned with contemporary practices, or the reasonableness
of societal reliance on physician assisted suicide. 151
14

Id. at 710 n.8. The footnote reads:

See Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790, 847 & nn.10-13 (9th
Cir. 1996) (Beezer, J., dissenting) ("In total, forty-four states, the District of
Columbia and two territories prohibit or condemn assisted suicide.") (citing
statutes and cases); Rodriguez v. British Columbia (Att'y Gen.), [19931 107
D.L.R. (4th) 342, 404 (Can.) ("[A] blanket prohibition on assisted suicide ... is
the norm among western democracies.") (discussing assisted-suicide
provisions in Austria, Spain, Italy, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands,
Denmark, Switzerland, and France). Since the Ninth Circuit's decision,
Louisiana, Rhode Island, and Iowa have enacted statutory assisted-suicide
bans. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 14:32.12 (Supp. 1997); R. I. Gen. Laws §§ 11-60-1,
11-60-3 (Supp. 1996); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 707A.2, 707A.3 (Supp. 1997). For a
detailed history of the States' statutes, see Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide:
A ConstitutionalRight?, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 148-242 (1985) (Appendix).
Id.
146

See Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944, 955-56 (11th Cir. 2001), rev'd, 220 F.

Supp. 2d 1257, 1275 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
117 Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 810.
148 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 723.
149 Id. at 721 (internal citation omitted).
150 Id. at 728 (emphasis added).
"' While this reading finds support in the text of the opinion, see supra notes
141-51 and accompanying text, and in lower court interpretation, see infra notes 24244, it is not the majority reading. See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 12, at 1119 ("Under the
Glucksberg approach, fundamental rights constituted a frozen category and a limiting
principle that operated to bar any meaningful protection for interests that could not
meet its eligibility criteria.") (citing John 0. McGinnis, Reviving Tocqueville's America:
The Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence of Social Discovery, 90 CAL. L. REV. 485, 568
(2002) ("The majority opinion [in Glucksberg] offered an analysis of fundamental rights
that suggested that there would be few such announcements in the future.")); Post,
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Chief Justice Rehnquist, in Glucksberg, also addressed
152
Justice Harlan's formulation of substantive due process,
15
which Justice Souter proposed in his concurring opinion. 3

Justice Souter read Justice Harlan's formulation as a
"reminder that the business of [substantive due process] review
is not the identification of extratextual absolutes but scrutiny
of a legislative resolution (perhaps unconscious) of clashing
principles, each quite possibly worthy in and of itself, but each

154
to be weighed within the history of our values as a people."

In other words, substantive due process inquiry should be an
attempt to "balance"155 respect for liberty against "arbitrary
impositions" or "purposeless restraints." 156 That is, "[tihis
approach calls for a court to assess the relative 'weights' or
dignities of the contending interests, and to this extent the
" 57
judicial method is familiar to the common law. 1
58
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, disagreed.1
He favored a "fundamental-rights-based analytical method"159
over Justice Souter's "balanc[ing]. " 160
To combat Justice
Souter's argument for the reaffirmation of Justice Harlan's
formulation,161 the Chief Justice downplayed Casey's acceptance
of Justice Harlan's theory by noting that "opinion's emphasis
on stare decisis."162 Substantive due process's "reliance,"'supra note 10, at 91; Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 40 ("[I1n a
dramatic departure from both Bowers and Glucksberg, the [Lawrence] Court said that
long-standing traditions were not decisive."); Tribe, The "FundamentalRight," supra
note 1, at 1924 ("That the Glucksberg gambit should not be allowed to succeed does not
mean that it might not have succeeded. If Chief Justice Rehnquist had had his way,
the Glucksberg decision might have become the forerunner of a general retreat from
the jurisprudence of decisions like Roe and Casey."). Perhaps as the future writings of
the courts and professors bring a fuller meaning to Lawrence, such will also bring a
changed reading of Glucksberg reconciled, to some degree, with that future reading.
See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1139 ("Perhaps the most significant point to bear in mind
is that the function of lower federal courts, scholars, and practitioners now will be not
so much to find the meaning of Lawrence as to create it.").
152 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721, 721 n.17, 733 n.23.
15 Id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring).

Id. at 764 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 756 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring) (citing Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543
(1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
157 Id. at 767 (Souter, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted).
158 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705-22.
154
155

159 Id. at 721 n.17.

Id. at 756 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring).
See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
162 Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 n.17.
13 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 957 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
160
161
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however, surpassed mere stare decisis application in Casey.
Just as Casey used assessment of reasonable societal reliance
to affirm Roe, Chief Justice Rehnquist used the same
assessment of reasonable societal reliance in his inquiry in
Glucksberg.6
The Chief Justice rejected Justice Harlan's
formulation but did not reject Justice Harlan's implicit
understanding that substantive due process inquiry should
consider contemporary practices or current societal reliances.165
B.

Lawrence v. Texas

Hailed as a breakthrough,166 the majority opinion in
Lawrence was a watershed for both homosexual rights and for
substantive due process analysis. A strong dissent, however,
challenged that movement.
1. The Lawrence Majority's Breakthrough
In Lawrence v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that
state laws cannot forbid private gay sexual behavior.167 The
"opaque" manner in which the Lawrence majority reached its
holding, however, has been an impetus for debate. - Like the
availability of contraceptives in Griswold, the Lawrence Court
failed to explicitly inquire into the prevalence of homosexuality
in 2003.169 The actual number, according to conservative
estimates, fell between three and six percent of the
population. 170 On the other hand, the Court explicitly noted
that proscriptions against private gay sexual behavior were

See generally Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710-19.
See id.
166 See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1137 ("Lawrence is a breakthrough.").
167 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).
166 See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 29, 45
164
165

(describing Lawrence as a "remarkably opaque opinion" that "raises a number of
puzzles"); see also Hunter, supra note 12, at 1103 ("The Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence v. Texas is easy to read, but difficult to pin down.") (internal citation
omitted); but cf. Karlan, supra note 13, at 1449 ("Like Loving, Lawrence marks a
crystallization of doctrine.").
169 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-79.
170 See Kirk Cameron, Family Research Inst., The Numbers Game: What
Percentage
of
the
Population
is
Gay?
(May
1993),
available at
http'/www.familyresearchinst.orgFRIAIMTalk.html; see also Katy Butler, Many
Couples Must Negotiate Terms of 'Brokeback' Marriages,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2006, at
F5 (citing a 1990 study headed by Edward 0. Laumann of the University of Chicago
which found that 3.9 percent of American men who had ever been married had had sex
with men in the previous five years).
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systematically not enforced.171
Continuing, the Court also
ducked the question of whether Glucksberg should be
interpreted as demanding substantive due process inquiry into
contemporary practices by surprisingly failing to cite the
opinion once. 172 This omission permitted Justice Scalia to
forward his conceptualization of Glucksberg three times in
dissent without challenge.173
The Court also ducked the
question of the relevance of Justice Harlan's "balancing"
formulation 174 by failing to mention it once. 175 Despite all of
this, Lawrence's "emerging awareness" language and its
holding make clear that substantive due process analysis must
take into account present reliances. 176
In determining the scope of proper substantive due
process inquiry, Justice Kennedy stated:
In all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half
century are of most relevance here. These references show an
emerging awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to
adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in
matters pertaining to sex. History and tradition are the starting
point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
17 7
process inquiry.

Justice Kennedy could hardly be more explicit; he stated
that substantive due process inquiry should not only engage
contemporary practices but emphasized that those practices
would, in fact, be given the "most relevance."17 8 This is not
171 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 ("In those states where sodomy is still
proscribed, whether for same-sex or heterosexual conduct, there is a pattern of
nonenforcement with respect to consenting adults acting in private."); see Karlan,
supra note 13, at 1452 n.34 (noting "[tihe law [at issue in Lawrence] was virtually
never enforced") (citing State v. Morales, 869 S.W.2d 941, 943 (Tex. 1994) (holding
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the antisodomy statute ruled unconstitutional in
Lawrence because of "the Attorney General's contention that [the statute] has not been,
and in all probability will not be, enforced against private consensual conduct between
adults.")); Sunstein, What did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 27-28 ("[Wlhen
constitutionally important interests are at stake, due process principles requiring fair
notice, and banning arbitrary action, are violated if criminal prosecution is brought on
the basis of moral judgments lacking public support, as exemplified by exceedingly rare
enforcement activity.").
172 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-79.
173 Id. at 588, 593 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
175 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562-79.
176

See Post, supra note 10, at 8 ("Properly read .

.

. Lawrence .

.

. reveals a

Court that defines the substance of constitutional law in the context of the beliefs and
values of nonjudicial actors.").
177 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72 (internal citations omitted).
178

Id.
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offhand dicta but a central formulation that

persisted

throughout his opinion. 179 For example, Justice Kennedy
criticized Chief Justice Burger's "sweeping references ...
to the

history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral
and ethical standards" in Bowers v. Hardwick,180 the precedent
Lawrence overruled. In doing so, Justice Kennedy noted that
the then contemporary "authorities pointing in an opposite
direction" should have been taken into account. 8'

Justice

Kennedy thereby insisted the Court should have been
considering contemporary practices or current societal
reliances when Bowers was decided. To the Lawrence Court,
proper substantive due process inquiry has and should
continue to include analysis of current societal reliances.182

Crucial as well was Lawrence's treatment of Casey.183
Justice Kennedy noted in Lawrence that the "foundations of
Bowers have sustained serious erosion from our recent
decisions in Casey and Romer."- 8 It is easy to understand why
Romer

v.

Evans18--which

struck

down

a

Colorado

constitutional amendment denying the possibility of specified
protections for homosexuals-would have weakened Bowers.
Less clear, however, is why Casey would have, especially if it
were merely decided upon stare decisis of Roe.186 Justice
Kennedy, thankfully, clarified:
In Casey we noted that when a Court is asked to overrule a
precedent recognizing a constitutional liberty interest, individual or
societal reliance on the existence of that liberty cautions with
particular strength against reversing course. The holding in Bowers,
however, has not induced detrimental reliance comparable to some
instances where recognized individual rights are involved. Indeed,
there has been no individual or societal reliance on Bowers of the sort
that could counsel against overturning its holding once there are
compelling reasons to do so.187

1719See, e.g., id. at 573 ("The 25 States with laws prohibiting the relevant
conduct referenced in the Bowers decision are reduced now to 13, of which 4 enforce
their laws only against homosexual conduct.").
180 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (permitting state criminalization of sodomy), overruled
by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
181 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
182 See Post, supra note 10, at 11 ("The Court must ...

embed constitutional

law within the beliefs and values of nonjudicial actors.").
183 See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571,573, 574.
184 Id. at 576.
185 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
18
187

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 722 n.17 (1997).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
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Reaffirming societal reliance's pivotal role in Casey,
Justice Kennedy moved passed mere stare decisis: Just because
society had rejected the logic of Bowers did not in itself
Reasonable societal reliance on
mandate Bowers' ruin.1precedent may caution against a precedent's reversal, but that
logic in no way works in the reverse. Just because there was
no societal reliance on Bowers does not mandate unlocking a
new substantive due process right in Lawrence, unless
reasonable societal reliance itself is intertwined with
substantive due process inquiry.
Lawrence and Glucksberg therefore confirmed that stare
decisis was merely a middleman in Casey and that proper
substantive due process analysis demands inquiry into
reasonable societal reliances. 189 Just as Glucksberg demanded
understanding
of contemporary
practices, 190
Lawrence
demanded investigation into "emerging awareness[es]" of
recent years. 191 There is consistency, therefore, from Lawrence
back through Glucksberg, through Casey and further: The
societal reliances relevant to substantive due process inquiry
are not just those of the framers' generation but also those of
the generations that followed. As stated in Casey, "[an entire
generation has come of age free to assume Roe's concept of
liberty in defining the capacity of women to act in society,"192
Lawrence echoed, "[a]s the Constitution endures, persons in
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search
" 193
for greater freedom.

188

The Court could have chosen to follow Justice O'Connor's narrower equal

protection analysis and not overrule Bowers. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579 (O'Connor,
J., concurring); see also Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 37 ("An
equal protection ruling in Lawrence, based on these cases, would have had a great deal
of appeal. It would have made it unnecessary for the Court to reconsider Bowers v
Hardwick.'); id. at 73 ("I believe that an equal protection ruling, of the sort sketched by
Justice O'Connor, would have been preferable, not least because it would have
emphasized what should be clear to all: The problem in Lawrence had everything to
[do] with the social subordination of gays and lesbians.").
189

See Post, supra note 10, at 8, 11.

1o Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 710.
191 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
192

Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 860 (1992).

193

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 579; see Tribe, The "FundamentalRight,' supra note

1, at 1942 ("[Clonstraints premised on the belief that the institutional design of a
society organized with our constitutional aspirations must be flexible and permeable
enough to accommodate new ways of experiencing connection and growth both within
personal relationships and within associations whose size may preclude calling them
'personal' . ....'); see generally Laurence H. Tribe, Structural Due Process, 10 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 269, 290-321 (1975).
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2. The Lawrence Dissent
Lawrence was a breakthrough,194 but Lawrence had a
dissent. Justice Scalia's "forceful"95 opinion, joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the author of Glucksberg, arguably throws
into question the strength of Glucksberg's assertion that
inquiry into reasonable societal reliance is vital in substantive
due process analysis.196 Justice Scalia described Lawrence as
"quite right that history and tradition are the starting point
but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due
process inquiry."197 But Justice Scalia did not see Glucksberg
as mandating understanding of contemporary practices.
Instead, he believed the "ending point" is-quoting
Glucksberg-whether "[an asserted 'fundamental liberty
interest'" is also "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,' so
that 'neither liberty nor justice would exist if [that interest]
were sacrificed.'"198
More explicitly, Justice Scalia wrote, "Roe and Casey
have been equally eroded by Washington v. Glucksberg, which
held that only fundamental rights which are deeply rooted in
this Nation's history and tradition qualify for anything other
than rational basis scrutiny under the doctrine of substantive
due process."199 If Chief Justice Rehnquist believed that only
deeply rooted rights at the founding qualified for substantive
due process protection, his Glucksberg opinion's explicit search
°
for the strength of contemporary practices is confused at best. 2
That is, if the then Chief Justice truly concurred with Justice
Scalia that "[cionstitutional entitlements do not spring into
existence because some States choose to lessen or eliminate
criminal sanctions on certain behavior,"201 the question remains
why so much of Glucksberg studied just such movement of
state criminal sanctions on physician assisted suicide.202
A more coherent answer to why Chief Justice Rehnquist
disapproved of the Lawrence majority would be that he had
14

See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1137 ("Lawrence is a breakthrough.").

'9

See Tribe, The "FundamentalRight," supra note 1, at 1925-26.

196 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
197

Id. at 593 n.3 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).

198

Id.

(Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S.

702, 721 (1997)).
19 Id. at 588 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
200 See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
20 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
202 See supra notes 141-51 and accompanying text.
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moved from his Glucksberg opinion,23 if not from his intention,
and he furthermore agreed with Justice Scalia's secondary
argument: that Lawrence "laid waste the foundations of our
The dissenters argued the
rational-basis jurisprudence."204
Lawrence majority subverted the Court's longstanding twoUnder classic
tiered substantive due process analysis.205
substantive due process analysis, a certain practice is
determined to be "fundamental," and thereby to trigger "strict
scrutiny," or if it were not "fundamental," less demanding
"rational basis review" is used.206
In the dissenters' view, the Court departed from this
approach. The Lawrence majority never determined private
homosexual conduct to be "fundamental."207 As Justice Scalia
expressed it, "[t]hough there is discussion of 'fundamental
propositions,' and 'fundamental decisions,' nowhere does the
Court's opinion declare that homosexual sodomy is a
'fundamental right' under the Due Process Clause."-8 The
dissent continued, "[i]nstead the Court simply describes
petitioners' conduct as 'an exercise of their liberty'-which it
undoubtedly is-and proceeds to apply an unheard-of form of
203 Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Glucksberg is at odds with the dissent
he joined in Lawrence. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist "beg[aln" his Glucksberg

opinion by "examining our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. In almost

every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is a crime to assist a
suicide. The States' assisted-suicide bans are not innovations [but] longstanding
expressions of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation of all human
life." Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997) (emphasis added) (internal
citations omitted). He could not have begun as such in Lawrence and still dissented.
For example, as the Lawrence majority observed, the Nation's "practices" included
homosexual activity. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-72 ("In all events we think that our
laws and traditions in the past half century are of most relevance .

. . .").

As the

Lawrence majority also implied, "[wiestern democrac[ies]" have refused to criminalize
homosexual conduct. Id. at 577 ("The right the petitioners seek in this case has been
accepted as an integral part of human freedom in many other countries.").
Furthermore, as the Lawrence majority noted, our Nation's "history" and "legal
traditions" against homosexual activity are not "longstanding expressions" of rejection
of homosexual conduct. Id. at 568 ("At the outset it should be noted that there is no
longstanding history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a
distinct matter.").
204 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
205 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
206 See supra notes 81-88 and accompanying text; see also Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 720.
207 To a theory of constitutional interpretation that refuses to depart from the
time of the framing, the dissent is probably correct that the "right to engage in
homosexual acts is not deeply rooted in America's history and tradition." See
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 589 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX
AND REASON 343 (1992)).
208

omitted).

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations
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rational-basis review that will have far-reaching implications
beyond this case."209 The Lawrence opinion, thereby, could be
read as moving towards Justice Harlan's unmentioned
"balancing" formulation,210 a move the Lawrence dissenters
resisted.211
In going further, however, the dissent showed the
coherence of the Court's movement towards a substantive due
process analysis centered on inquiry into reasonable societal
reliances.
Justice Scalia wrote of the "impossibility of
distinguishing homosexuality from other traditional 'morals'
offenses."212 That is, bans upon private consensual, homosexual
conduct were supposedly indistinguishable from proscriptions
against "bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
and
masturbation,
adultery,
fornication,
bestiality,
All of which were supposedly "called into
obscenity."213
question" by a Lawrence majority that allegedly held "none of
the above-mentioned laws [could] survive rational-basis
review."214

But there is an easy way to distinguish private
consensual, homosexual behavior from conduct such as
5
"bigamy" and "bestiality":21
reasonable societal reliance. With
the homosexual community becoming established, ' 16 reasonable
29 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
210 See supra notes 74-79, 145-49 and accompanying text.
211 See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1121 ("The fullest explication of an
alternative position, now largely adopted through Lawrence, came in Justice Souter's
concurring opinion in Glucksberg. Justice Souter drew extensively from Justice
Harlan's dissent in Poe v. Ullman.").
212 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
213 Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
214 Id. at 590, 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting); but see Carpenter, supra note 139, at
1169 ("[T]he Court did not even broadly declare that morality is no longer a permissible
basis for law."); Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1082-83 ("Is Lawrence the end of morals
legislation in the United States? Don't believe it. England did not fall down Lord
Devlin's slippery slope after it decriminalized consensual sodomy in 1967, and there is
no reason the United States will fall down Scalia's slipperier slope.") (internal citations
omitted); Hunter, supra note 12, at 1112 ("By finding that morality alone cannot justify
a prohibition, the Court did not seal the fate of all the various statutes thought of as
morals laws. Rather, a state must now demonstrate some other rationale for such
laws, presumably some form of objectively harmful effects."); Karlan, supra note 13, at
1458 ("In this sense, Justice Scalia's hyperbolic dissent . . . misses the mark. While
those laws unquestionably prevent some individuals from engaging in some behavior..
. that behavior is not tied as an empirical matter in contemporary America to
membership in a recognized social group.").
215 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 590 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
216 See Karlan, supra note 13, at 1458 ("[Glay people in the United States do
form a social group whose membership extends beyond their engaging in specific
sexual acts.").
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reliance on the ability to engage in such conduct easily
separates it from say, "adult incest," even if any such
"awareness"217 of homosexuality were impracticable at the time
of the framing.218 Justice Scaila contended that Lawrence
entailed "a massive disruption of the current social order."219
Such a disruption is, however, diametrically opposed to
Lawrence's protection of private consensual homosexual
conduct if its substantive due process analysis is based upon
appreciation of contemporary reasonable societal reliances.21
Glucksberg refused to find a substantive due process
right to physician assisted suicide.221
Lawrence found a
substantive due process right to private homosexual
behavior.222 Both found reasonable societal reliances central to
substantive due process inquiry.223
V.

WILLIAMS: THE BATTLE FOR LAWRENCE

The impact of Glucksberg and Lawrence will be worked
out in the lower federal courts in the years to come. 224 One
example was the drama on display in the handling and
rehandling of the Willams case in the Eleventh Circuit.
Originally, in Williams v. Pryor, a district court foreshadowed
Lawrence and read Glucksberg to demand inquiry into the
"contemporary practices" of a questioned behavior in
substantive due process review. 225
It thereby found
constitutional protections for the use of certain devices in
private sexual conduct.226 However, the Eleventh Circuit, in
Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama, even with the
217

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.

Id. at 589 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND
REASON 343 (1992) (reporting the "right to engage in homosexual acts is not deeply
rooted in America's history and tradition")).
219 Id. at 591 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
220 See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 31 ("[Lawrence]
was possible only because of the ludicrously poor fit between the sodomy prohibition
and the society in which the justices live. And if I am correct, Lawrence will have
broad implications only if and to the extent that those broad implications receive
general public support.").
221 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 702 (1997).
222 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
215

223

See Post, supra note 10, at 8 ("Properly read . . .Lawrence .

. .

reveals a

Court that defines the substance of constitutional law in the context of the beliefs and
values of nonjudicial actors.").
21 See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1103, 1139.
225 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1275 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
226 Id. at 1307.
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Its
intervening "breakthrough" of Lawrence,227 reversed.22
reading of Glucksberg and Lawrence emphatically rejected the
"contemporary practices" understanding of the district court. 229
The two cases, therefore, present a working framework to
analyze how lower federal courts will grapple with the degree
to which Glucksberg and Lawrence demand inquiry into
reasonable societal reliance in substantive due process review.
To begin with, the history of Williams itself is wrapped
in Lawrence. The case was first decided in favor of the
plaintiffs, protecting use of devices in private sexual conduct,
by a district court in March of 1999.230 It was subsequently
reversed and remanded by the Eleventh Circuit in January
2001.231 Justice Scalia, in his Lawrence dissent, cited that
opinion.232 The district court again found for the plaintiffs in
Interestingly, Justice Scalia failed to
October 2002.23
mention-nor did any other opinion in Lawrence-the district
court's remand opinion, which was written eight months before
the Lawrence decision. 23 Subsequently, the Eleventh Circuit
This
again reversed the district court again in July 2004.Note addresses the second opinions of both the district court
and the Eleventh Circuit.
Williams v. Pryor

A.

In Williams v. Pryor, the district court dealt with an
Alabama statute236 that made it "unlawful to sell or otherwise
distribute any device designed or marketed as useful primarily
for the stimulation of human genital organs." 237 The state
argued such a law was necessary to "protect children" as well
as "for its own sake" because the "commerce of sexual
227 See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1137 ("Lawrence is a breakthrough.").

378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1244 n.14.
23' Williams v. Pryor, 41 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Ala. 1999).
228
229

231 Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001).
232 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 589 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It

seems to me that the 'societal reliance' on the principles confirmed in Bowers and
discarded today has been overwhelming .... See, e.g., Williams v. Pryor, 240 F.3d 944,
949 (11th Cir. 2001).").
223 Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1307 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
2

Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558-606.

2-5 Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
236

Alabama's Anti-Obscenity Enforcement Act, ALA. CODE § 13A-12-200.2

237

Williams, 378 F.3d at 1233 (internal citations omitted).

(2003).
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stimulation and auto-eroticism ...unrelated to marriage,
procreation or familial relationships [is] an evil, an obscenity ...
detrimental to the health and morality of the state."2-4
Numerous plaintiffs, including retailers and consumers, joined
to obtain an injunction against the law.239

The district court

held "this Nation's history, tradition, and contemporary
treatment of sexual devices themselves evidences that this
right of sexual privacy, even in its narrowest form, protects
plaintiffs' use of sexual devices like those targeted by Alabama
Code."24o

In its holding, the district court affirmed Glucksberg's
instruction that substantive due process demands inquiry into
contemporary practices. The court stated:
Significantly, Glucksberg extended this analysis [of our Nation's
history, legal traditions, and practices] to include a review of the
contemporary practices and attitudes regarding assisted suicide:
specifically, the Court looked to current statutes and those of "recent
years," "public concern," "democratic action," and twentieth century
model legislation and its effect on state legislation. 24 1

The district court continued, "[in light of the fundamental
rights analysis employed by the Glucksberg Court, the parties
may also point to evidence of contemporary practices in this
country that evince or contravene a fundamental right of
sexual privacy."-2 Furthermore, it was appropriate for the
"[pllaintiffs" to "rely on such evidence."2-

The district court was not maverick in its reading of
Glucksberg, even within the Eleventh Circuit. The court cited
the Eleventh Circuit's previous Williams v. Pryor opinion2- as

"instructing [it] to conduct a review of contemporary practice in
light of Glucksberg's similar analysis."245 The court also noted
the Eleventh Circuit's citation of Glucksberg's discussion
238 Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 1301.
239 Id. at 1260-61.
240 Id. at 1259 (emphasis added); see also id. ("[The] evidence has convinced
this court that there exists a substantial history, legal tradition, and contemporary
practice of deliberate state non-interference in the private, consensual, sexual
relationships of married persons and unmarried adults.").
241 Id. at 1275 (citing Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 715-716 (1997)
(emphasis added)).
242 Id. at 1289 (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 715-716 (emphasis added)).

243 Id.
2" 240 F.3d 944 (11th Cir. 2001); see supra notes 230-35 and accompanying

text.
245 Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp 2d. 1257, 1275 (N.D. Ala. 2002) (internal
citations omitted).
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concerning the "considerable contemporary
nationwide
legislative action to preserve [anti-physician assisted suicide]
laws.246
Moreover, despite the district court's ruling predating
Lawrence, it appears to be in line with that decision as
evidenced by its ability to foreshadow the holding. The district
court noted the weakness of Bowers v. Hardwick, exemplified
by the dwindling number of states with criminal sodomy
prohibitions.247 In addition, the district court cited the same
Model Penal Code (MPC) commentary the Lawrence Court
would later find so persuasive.24 The district court specifically
noted the MPC's recommendation that "private immorality
should be beyond the reach of the penal law."249 The district
court continued, "states should punish only non-consensual
sexual acts between any two people regardless of sex,"250
observations the Lawrence Court would later embrace.251
B.

Williams v. Attorney General of Alabama

The Eleventh Circuit in Williams v. Attorney General of
Alabama, however, reversed the district court's holding, even
after the Lawrence decision.252 In doing so, the circuit court
specifically held that the district court "erred" in placing "too
much weight on contemporary practice and attitudes."253 In the
circuit court's view, the district court "considerably
overstate [d]"
Glucksberg's "reliance
on
contemporary
attitudes."2To the circuit court, Glucksberg's incessant
reference
of
contemporary
practices
was
mere
"reinforcement"5 or "merely one factor among many" or simple
"buttressing," but "never essential" to the "Court's conclusion

Id. at 1274 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 1294.
248 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003) ("In 1955 the American Law
Institute promulgated the Model Penal Code and made clear that it did not recommend
or provide for 'criminal penalties for consensual sexual relations conducted in private.'
ALI, Model Penal Code § 213.2, Comment 2, p. 372 (1980)."); Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d.
at 1288 n.135.
249 See Williams, 220 F. Supp. 2d. at 1293.
250 Id. (internal citations omitted).
251 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
252 Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
253 Id. at 1242.
254 Id. at 1243.
255 Id. (emphasis omitted).
246

247
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that assisted suicide is not deeply rooted in the history and
traditions of the nation."256
Continuing, the circuit court largely ignored Lawrence's
"emerging awareness" language,257 until it appeared to reject it
outright:
The focus on the trajectory of contemporary practice ultimately
proves too much. The fact that there is an emerging consensus
scarcely provides justification for the courts, who often serve as an
antimajoritarian seawall, to be swept up with the tide of popular
culture. If anything, it is added reason for us to permit the
8
democratic process to take its course.2

This response wants it both ways: The court is supposed to be
both an "antimajoritarian seawall" as well as to let the
legislative process "take its course."2 9
The logic is
contradictory. A court cannot logically reason that it should let
the legislature alone because the bench rightly acts in an
antimajoritarian manner. The "tide of popular culture" that
the courts should raise themselves above is not the newly
establishing--or rooting-practices but the majoritarian
animus against them. Plaintiffs, after all, do not seek relief in
the courts if the legislature has already provided it.260
Echoing Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence, the circuit
court bypassed Lawrence fearing "[ilf we were to accept the
invitation to recognize a right to sexual intimacy, this right
would theoretically encompass such activities as prostitution,
obscenity, and adult incest--even if we were to limit the right
to consenting adults."61 Again scorning the district court's
analysis for too easily finding protected behavior, the circuit
court derided the lower court's failure to correctly distinguish
between
historical
"protection" and
historical
"noninterference."262
"Under this approach," the circuit court
Id. at 1243-44.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 572.
258 Williams, 378 F.3d at 1244 n.14.
259 Id.
260 See Post, supra note 10, at 8, 11; cf Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1065 ("The
political philosophy supporting that new floor is a jurisprudence of tolerance.
Underlying that jurisprudence is not only the moral philosophy notion of tolerable
variation, but also the political philosophy notion that mutual toleration is necessary
for the flourishing (or even the survival) of a pluralist democracy.") (emphasis omitted).
261 Williams, 378 F.3d at 1240.
262 See id. at 1244-45; but see id. at 1258 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
256
257

Contrary to the majority's claim, neither Glucksberg nor any other relevant
Supreme Court precedent supports the requirement that there must be a
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suggested, "the freedom to smoke, to pollute, to engage in
private discrimination, to commit marital rape-at one time or
another-all could have been elevated to fundamental-rights
status."20 Such is a caricature, at best, of substantive due
process. First, a thorough due process analysis would demand
some degree of inquiry into whether the right was "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty"264 or intertwined to personal
autonomy, 26 5 a test of the above examples unanimously fail.
Second, whether a practice is becoming more or less prevalent,
its direction so to speak, is an essential element in how
reasonable it is to rely upon that practice. In other words,
inquiry into reasonable current societal reliance and not the
traditions of the founding is perhaps the best way to
distinguish due process protected practices from marital rape
and certain forms of government sanctioned discrimination,
both of which are now abhorrent to our "concept of ordered
liberty" but were once indeed well-rooted in our traditions.266
Third, just because there is current societal reliance on a
practice, e.g. smoking, does not mean that that practice is
unassailable.
It only means adverse legislation must be
history of affirmative legislative protection before a right can be judicially
protected.
The majority simply invents this requirement, effectively
redefining the doctrine of substantive due process to protect only those rights
that are already explicitly protected by law. Such a requirement ignores not
only Lawrence but also a complete body of Supreme Court jurisprudence.
Had the Supreme Court required affirmative governmental protection of an
asserted liberty interest, all of the Court's privacy cases would have been
decided differently. For instance, there was no lengthy tradition of protecting
abortion and the use of contraceptives, yet both were found to be protected by
a right to privacy under the Due Process Clause.
263

Id. at 1244.

264

See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (citing Palko v.

Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
265 See Post, supra note 10, at 89 ("Mhe Court ha[s] adopted two distinct
approaches to defining ... substantive due process. The first, which I shall call the
traditional approach, focuse[s] on a hermeneutics of history and tradition; the second,
which I shall call the autonomy approach, focuse[s] on the forms of liberty prerequisite
for personal dignity and autonomy.") (internal citation omitted); but see Randy E.
Barnett, Kennedy's LibertarianRevolution, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, July 10, 2003,
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-barnett07l0O3.asp ("Mhe Court in
Lawrence did not protect a 'right of privacy.' Rather, it protected 'liberty' . .. .);
Hunter, supra note 12, at 1106 ("Perhaps the Court, while sounding like it is writing to
praise privacy, has secretly come to bury it, by shifting in a subtle way back to the
underlying concept of liberty, which-unlike privacy-has an unambiguous mooring in
constitutional text.").
266 See, e.g., Michelle J. Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships,
and Improper Inferences: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS
L.J. 1465 (2003); Alfreda Robinson, Troubling "Settled" Waters: The Opportunity and
PerilofAfrican-American Reparations,24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 139 (2004).
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sufficiently tailored (or perhaps balanced267) to a sufficiently
compelling state interest, i.e. health.2s
The Eleventh Circuit also wanted to have it both ways
in accepting the logic of Justice Scalia's dissent in Lawrence
but not his conclusions for the implications of Lawrence's
majority opinion.
Justice Scalia reasoned that Lawrence
eliminated the ability of states to legislate on the basis of
public morality.269 The circuit court, giving "all due respect to
Justice Scalia's ominous dissent,"270 decided otherwise.271
Public morality, to them, despite Lawrence, remained fully
capable of supporting legislation.272
Adversely, Judge Barkett's dissent in the Eleventh
Circuit provided some counterbalance to the majority's holding
and the direction it pulled both Glucksberg and Lawrence.273
Judge Barkett exposed the majority's failure to understand
how the
Court's precedents
mandated inquiry into
contemporary practices-if not explicit reasonable societal
reliance-in substantive due process inquiry.274 She stressed,
"[als the Lawrence Court emphasized, [hlistory and tradition
are the starting point but not in all cases the ending point of
the substantive due process inquiry."275
"Given this
unequivocal statement," she continued, "the majority cannot
legitimately criticize the district court for its attention to
contemporarypracticeand attitudes."276
Judge Barkett's dissent more closely accords the spirit
of Lawrence than does the Eleventh Circuit's majority's
opinion.277 Nevertheless, Judge Barkett was unable to convince
267 See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 756 n.4 (Souter, J., concurring).
268 Id. at 721.

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 590 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1238 n.8.
271 Id. ("One would expect the Supreme Court to be manifestly more specific
and articulate than it was in Lawrence if now such a traditional and significant
jurisprudential principal has been jettisoned wholesale.").
272 Id.
273 Id. at 1250 (Barkett, J., dissenting).
274 Id. at 1251 ("In cases solely involving adult consensual sexual privacy, the
Court has never required that there be a long-standing history of affirmative legal
protection of specific conduct before a right can be recognized under the Due Process
Clause.").
275 Id. at 1258 (internal citations omitted).
276 Williams, 378 F.3d at 1258 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
277 See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 73 ("The
Constitution probably forbids government from punishing, either criminally or civilly,
those who have used sexual devices."); but cf. Recent Case, Eleventh Circuit Upholds
Alabama Statute, supra note 13, at 802 ("Although the majority was ultimately correct
269

270
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her circuit to strike Alabama's proscriptions against sexual
devices.278 Williams only underscores the need for those who
see value in a strong substantive due process to supplement its
constitutional justifications.279
C.

The Reasonable Societal Reliance Approach

A substantive due process analysis centered on
reasonable societal reliance would have provided for better
adjudication in Williams. The district court spent a great deal
of time, close to 12,000 words, discussing the history of sexual
devices.28 ° The circuit court, in turn, spent a fair amount of
8 1 While the
time of its own disagreeing with that history.2
historical trivialities surrounding the invention of the
electromechanical vibrator may be relevant in the study of
sexuality, it can seem strange to find them in substantive due
process law.
A substantive due process analysis strictly
confined to the time of the framing necessitates such a detailed,
time-sensitive understanding. Judge Barkett's dissenting urge
for analysis of "contemporary practice and attitudes,"2 82 if read
as mandating inquiry into reasonable societal reliance, would
position a court for a far more clear-sighted adjudication.283
In Williams, the evidence of reliance was mixed. For
over five years Sherri Williams, a plaintiff, annually sold
sexual devices to 14,960 customers through two stores
receiving annual revenues of $448,837.284 Decatur Pleasure, a
second plaintiff, annually sold to 5,600 customers generating
annual revenues of $169,093. 28 In 1997, Saucy Lady, a third

to uphold the Alabama statute, its restrictive reading of Lawrence was well off the
mark. The dissent, in contrast, favored an unjustifiably broad interpretation of
Lawrence that went beyond the limits of that case.").
278 Williams, 378 F.3d at 1250.
279 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
280 Williams v. Pryor, 220 F. Supp 2d. 1257, 1277-96 (N.D. Ala. 2002).
Williams, 378 F.3d at 1244-50 (amassing close to 3,500 words itself).
Id. at 1258 (Barkett, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
283 While the Justices may not be specialized social historians, they are
281

282

certainly aware of the current political climate. As Mr. Dooley famously put it: "no
matter whether th' constitution follows th' flag or not, th' supreme court follows th'
ilection returns." See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 27 (citing
PETER DuNNE, THE SUPREME CouRT's DECISIONS, IN MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26
(1900)).
284 Williams, 220 F. Supp 2d. at 1263.

28

Id.
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plaintiff, held saleg-parties286 drawing an attendance of 7,700.287
These statistics of reliance, and the direction in which they are
moving,288 are more in line with what Justice Kennedy referred
to as the possibility of an "emerging awareness" and are better
suited to determine substantive due process protection.289
In the end, Justice Kennedy, in his majority opinion, did
not determine the final impact and extent of Lawrence. That
will only be done in Lawrence's future application by judges,
lawyers, and law professors.290 As Williams has shown, those
who favor a strong substantive due process have lost the first
contest.2 91 To not lose the next, supplements to the past
constitutional justifications for substantive due process need to
be forwarded.292 Adding explicit reasonable societal reliance
inquiry to substantive due process analysis is one achievable
293
way to keep substantive due process strong.
VI.

CONCLUSION

As has been shown, inquiry into reasonable societal
reliance has permeated the underpinnings and the
jurisprudential history of substantive due process.29 4 This
inquiry is now, however, in doubt.
On the one hand,
Glucksberg and Lawrence arguably enshrined inquiry of
"contemporary practices and attitudes" into substantive due
process review. 29 5 On the other, Justice Scalia's "forceful"296
286 Id. at 1264 ("[Vendor plaintiff B.J. Bailey is an Alabama resident who
owns and operates Saucy Lady, Inc., an Alabama corporation that conducts in-house
Tupperware-style parties at which sexual aids and novelties are displayed and sold.")
(internal citations omitted).
287 Id. at 1265.
2 Business seemed to be increasing. See id. at 1263 ("In 1998, through July
1, [Sherri Williams') Huntsville store sold approximately 10,060 items and generated
gross revenues of approximately $201,314... Decatur Pleasures ...[in 1998, through
July 1 . . . sold approximately 5,170 items and generated gross revenues of
approximately $103,438.").
289 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
290 See Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1083, ("Lawrence does, however, clarify the
constitutional status of morals laws, and the academic debate will clarify their status
even more."); Hunter, supra note 12, at 1103, 1139.
291 It should be noted that the Eleventh Circuit sat for this case in only a
three-judge panel and therefore the margin of defeat was narrow. Williams v. Att'y
Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1232 (11th Cir. 2004).
292 See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
293 See Post, supra note 10, at 8,11.

2
295

29

See supraPart III.
See supra Part IV.
See Tribe, The "FundamentalRight," supra note 1, at 1925-26.

1624

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:4

dissent in Lawrence read Glucksberg as making no such
movement.297 And that dissent has convinced a majority of
9 8
judges on a split Eleventh Circuit Court to agree.2
It is on this unsettled footing that substantive due
process is forced to defend itself.- Those who wish to solidify
and expand the rights that substantive due process protects
should redouble the argument that inquiry into reasonable
societal reliance is a significant part of proper review.30
Summarily, the guardians of substantive due process should
push towards a jurisprudence sensitive to reasonable societal
reliances. They should do so because, in part, such a strategy
is more effective than merely amassing useful evidence of a
questioned behavior's historical relevance.301 Such a strategy is
also more supportive of a strong substantive due process than
is Justice Harlan's "balancing" formulation. °2 Furthermore, a
substantive due process sensitive to reasonable societal
reliances goes beyond merely ending morals-based legislation.
It also withstands criticisms that accuse due process inquiry of
resting solely with the subjective considerations of the
individual Justices.303 Additionally, it has a good chance at
34

success. 0

Amassing historical evidence to convince a court of the
need for substantive due process protection is an insufficient
strategy to protect the analysis. Williams v. Attorney General
°
of Alabama demonstrated the futility of this approach. 305
Despite the district court's accumulation of 104 supportive
footnotes3 °6 for its historical interpretation, the circuit court
easily dismissed these as "uncritical acceptance" of "selective
appendices of historical interpretations."307 The circuit court
even turned reliance on an admitted expert and concessions by
217 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).

"
299

Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
See supra note 2 and accompanying text.

30o See supra notes 28-36 and accompanying text.
301 See generally Williams, 378 F.3d at 1244-50.
302 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
303 See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (emphasizing
the requirement of some objectivity: "First, we have regularly observed that the Due
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are,
objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.") (internal citation
omitted); see also Post, supra note 10, at 91-92.
304 See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1118, 1122.
305 See Williams, 378 F.3d at 1244-50.
W6 Id.
at 1248.
307 Id. at 1246, 1248.
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the state of Alabama into further evidence of the district court's
imprudence.38
Courts are well-skilled enough to read a
historical record either way; a substantive due process
jurisprudence that inquires upon objective reasonable societal
reliance is not so easily misled. °9
Moving towards a jurisprudence centered on reasonable
societal reliance is also superior to Justice Harlan's substantive
due process
formulation.31o
After Lawrence, some
commentators
have suggested
that Justice
Harlan's
formulation may be back in play:311 Substantive due process
inquiry may become a version of judicially "balanc[ing] our
Nation, built upon postulates of respect for the liberty of the
individual... between that liberty and the demands of
organized society."32 If true, however, this alone is arguably
precarious for those who value a strong substantive due
process. A judiciary increasingly constructed in the shadows of
Justices Scalia and Thomas may only place a finger on the
313
scale against any new protections.
Those arguing that Lawrence decreed the end to moralsbased legislation are also well supplemented by the assertion
that substantive due process is becoming more sensitive of
reasonable societal reliances. 3' 4 Take the gay marriage debate
Foregoing equal protection arguments, 315
for example.
308

Id. at 1248.

309 Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1047 ("[Justice Kennedy's] subtle point was

that Justice White [in Bowers] was using history as a mechanism for writing his own
moral code into the Due Process Clause."); Post, supra note 10, at 90 ("It is true that
White's opinion in Bowers reviewed the historical record in so flat and disdainful a
manner as effectively to efface the Court's own normative involvement in evaluating
the present worth of the nation's tradition.").
310 See supra notes 74-79 and accompanying text.
... See, e.g., Hunter, supra note 12, at 1121; but see Sunstein, What Did

Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 48 ("[I1t would be quite surprising if the Court
meant to adopt a sliding scale of analysis without saying so. The more natural
interpretation is simpler: The Court's assimilation of the Lawrence problem to that in
Griswold and its successors suggests that a fundamental right was involved.").
312 Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
313 See Rebecca L. Brown, Tradition and Insight, 103 YALE L.J. 177, 182-83
(1993) (equating courts use of "traditions" with normative value choices); see also
Chemerinsky, supra note 43, at 47; Post, supra note 10, at 96 ("The [Lawrence] Court
unabashedly engages the values it perceives to be at stake in the case . .. Lawrence
plainly expresses its own vision of such truths.").
314 See Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1238 n.8 (11th Cir. 2004)
("One would expect the Supreme Court to be manifestly more specific and articulate
than it was in Lawrence if now such a traditional and significant jurisprudential
principal has been jettisoned wholesale.").
315 But see Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E. 2d 941, 961 (Mass.

2003) (using the Equal Protection Clause as well as the Due Process Clause of the
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heterosexual coupling can always be favored by a state on a
non-morals basis, e.g., support for childbirth.316 Once a gay
couple can reasonably rely upon being able to marry, for
example if several states were to follow Massachusetts' lead, if
it were to become accepted, a substantive due process inquiry
centered on reasonable societal reliance would be able to
protect the practice. 317 A reading of Lawrence that only decreed
the end to morals-based legislation could not.
Inquiry into reasonable societal reliance also rebuffs the
arguments that substantive due process is merely the
"subjective considerations" of judges inappropriately acting in
an elitist, anti-democratic nature. 318
Reasonable societal
reliance is at its essence an objective enterprise sensitive to
democratic values. 319 Furthermore, it would be hard to argue
that inquiry into societal reliance would either make
interpretation of the Constitution "too unstable" or "too
political" because the Justices would be bound by the wellrooting practices of American society that are by definition
sufficiently stable and supra-political.32° It would be equally
difficult, though not impossible, to argue that knowledge of the
American experience-its current constitution in a sense-is
disrespectful to its formal constitution.321
Moreover, arguing for a substantive due process
jurisprudence sensitive to reasonable societal reliance has a
Massachusetts Constitution to find marriage benefits must be permitted to homosexual
couples).
316 But see Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 73 ("The
hardest cases involve the failure to recognize same-sex marriages. If Lawrence is put
together with Loving and Zablocki, it would seem plausible to say that the government
would have to produce a compelling justification for refusing to recognize such
marriages, and compelling justifications are not easy to find.").
317 See Eskridge, supra note 42, at 1026 ("Contrary to the Lawrence dissent,
the Rehnquist Court will not, anytime soon, impose same-sex marriage on unwilling
states, at least in part because such a ruling would raise the stakes of politics in this
culture clash."); Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 72 ("[In my
view, the major difference between Lawrence and a ban on same-sex marriage is that
the sodomy law no longer fits with widespread public convictions, whereas the public
does not (yet) support same-sex marriages.").
318 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
319

See Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 33, 73

([Alnachronistic" statutes that are "almost never enforced," as was the one at issue in
Lawrence, present a "recipe for unpredictable and discriminatory enforcement
practices; they do violence to both democratic values and the rule of law.").
320 See Carpenter, supra note 139, at 1141-42 ("To most Americans, however,
[Lawrence] is less an ipse dixit announcing radical social change than it is a belated
recognition of what they had already learned about the humanity and dignity of gay
people.").
321 See supra note 41.
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probability of success.
With the death of Chief Justice
Rehnquist and the retirement of Justice O'Connor, the future
of substantive due process will largely rest on how Justices
interpret the precedents scripted by others no longer serving on
the Court. How Casey and Glucksberg are read will guide
substantive due process either towards strength or towards
weakness. As this Note has shown, there is considerable
divergence as to how substantive due process precedents are
read.322 Those favoring a strong substantive due process review
should forge an explicit sensitivity towards reasonable societal
reliances into those precedents3 23 Nonetheless, the majority in
Lawrence, Justices Kennedy, Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, point towards installing inquiry into reasonable
societal reliances into substantive due process review.324
Justices Thomas and Scalia dissent. 325 Even if President
Bush's new appointees to the Court follow his favored
Justices,326 the tally would still be five to four in favor of a due
process inquiry deferential to reasonable societal reliances.
A lot has been made about Chief Justice Roberts'
supposed judicial philosophy of "deference" or "modesty."327
While this is most likely deference to the other branches of the
federal government, 328 it should be extended to include
deference to reasonable societal reliances in substantive due
process inquiry. As Justice Scalia said of abortion rights: "If
only for the sake of its own preservation, the Court should
return this matter to the people-where the Constitution, by
its silence on the subject, left it-and let them decide, State by
State, whether this practice should be allowed." 329 To relieve
feared political pressure from the judiciary, the Court could
"return" a questioned practice to the people by finding that
analysis into reasonable societal reliances is central to proper
substantive due process inquiry. In the gay-marriage example,
a deferential and modest Court could avoid making normative
31

See, e.g., supra notes 273-79 and accompanying text.

323

See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1139 ("Perhaps the most significant point to

bear in mind is that the function of lower federal courts, scholars, and practitioners
now will be not so much to find the meaning of Lawrence as to create it.").
324 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 571-72 (2003).
31 See, e.g., supra notes 195-96 and accompanying text.
32 See Pollitt, supra note 10.
327 See, e.g., Dahlia Lithwick, Editorial, Deferential Calculus, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
21, 2005, at A25.
328 See id.
329 Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 956 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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value judgments by looking to the reliance upon the practice. A
Court not ready to find such reliance reasonable enough could
"return" the issue to the people by holding that as more
homosexuals adopt the practice, as it further roots in our
traditions, it will gain constitutional protection. This would
have the effect of bringing the activists surrounding this issue
away from the judiciary; they would have to fight the so-called
"culture wars" where arguably more appropriate, in the
culture, not the courts.
Ultimately, a substantive due process inquiry centered
on reasonable societal reliances may prove too conservative.
Such is true if indeed "[tihe Lawrence opinion marks a new
majority for Harlan's [formulation], in substance if not in
name."330 A new substantive due process jurisprudence only
more sensitive to reasonable societal reliances, it could be said,
might move too slowly towards social advances.3
But
returning to the gay marriage issue, a substantive due process
inquiry centered on reasonable societal reliances may not, in
fact, prove too frail to soon find equal marriage rights for
homosexuals. 33 2 The Court's substantive due process cases
have shown that when a significant minority continuously
engages in a liberty-centered behavior, that behavior will
330 Hunter, supra note 12, at 1122; but see Carpenter, supra note 139, at 1170
(arguing predictions "of a newly activist judiciary seem overblown").
331 Slow substantive due process is, however, better than dead. See Post,

supra note 10, at 85 ("Because substantive due process doctrine has historically
engaged in remarkably candid efforts to interpret and apply cultural values, Scalia
would abandon the doctrine altogether, viewing it as an improper 'springboard[] for
judicial lawmaking.') (citing ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 25, 142-43 (1997)).
332 This analysis does not take into account use of the Equal Protection Clause
which is arguably better suited to underlie such a holding. See Goodridge v. Dep't of
Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass. 2003) (using both due process and equal
protection principals to hold that the Massachusetts Constitution demands equal
marriage rights for homosexuals).
Because the Equal Protection Clause was designed as an attack on traditions,
it is a far more promising source of new constitutional doctrine than the right
to privacy. Most generally, the Due Process Clause is associated with the
protection of traditionally respected rights from novel or short-term change.
It is largely Burkean and backward-looking.
By contrast, the Equal
Protection Clause is self-consciously directed against traditional practices. It
was designed to counteract practices that were time-honored and expected to
endure. It is based on a norm of equality that operates as a critique of past
practices. Because opposition to homosexuality has deep historical roots, the
Equal Protection Clause is the more sensible source of constitutional
doctrine.
Cass R. Sunstein, Homosexuality and the Constitution, 70 IND. L.J. 1, 3 (1994) (internal
citations omitted).
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eventually receive due process protection. 333 Furthermore, the
more essential the practice, the sooner and stronger the
protection.334 It is still widely believed that most homosexuals
do not want to live as married couples. 335 Once it is accepted
that a significant percentage
of marriage-equivalent
relationships are between homosexuals, when the awareness
has emerged that a significant percent of all long-term,
monogamous, loving, child-rearing relationships are between
two people of the same sex, a substantive due process right will
follow.33
Following, it is often argued that the Court's best and
most prolific holdings occur when the Justices are ahead of,
catalyzing, not trailing society's advance. 337 A substantive due
process analysis centered on reasonable societal reliace would
at best forbid the Court from betraying rights on which it has
found reasonable reliance,338 but not forbid the Court from
moving forward and finding that a questioned practice, not yet
reasonably relied upon, indeed must/should be.- 9 That is,

" See supra Part III.B & C.
34 For example, the Court protected abortion rights although only two percent

of women between the ages 15 to 44 annually obtained the procedure. Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992); CDC, SURVEILLANCE 1996, supra note
131.
31 See, e.g., Posting of David Blankenhorn to Family Scholars Blog, There's
the Right to Do It, and Then There's Doing It, http://familyscholars.orglarchives/
2003_08_24_archive.html (Aug. 30, 2003, 20:31 EST) (citing Clifford Krauss, Free to
Marry, Canada Gays Say "Do I?," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2003, at 1, available at

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/31/international/americas/31CANA.html);

Melissa

Kilcoyne, Same-Sex Marriage Issue on State Ballot, MURRAY STATE NEWS, Sept. 17,
2004,
available
at
http'//www.thenews.org/news/200409/17/News/

SameSex.Marriage.Issue.On.State.Ballot-721599.shtml; Posting of Jason Kuznicki to
Positive Liberty, Freedom
Riders, http'//positiveliberty.com/2004/02/freedomriders.html; Al Rantel, Gay Talk Show Host Opposes Gay Marriage,NEWSMAX, Feb.
11, 2004, http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2004/211/]140806.shtml.
36 At which time it can be predicted that most of the hostile state legislation
forbidding gay marriage will be popularly revoked. See generally Roberts & Gibbons,
supra note 19.

...See, e.g., Post, supra note 10, at 88 ("Roe used substantive due process to
protect a liberty interest that the Court believed was constitutionally valuable, even if
that interest was not immanent in the history and tradition of the nation."); but cf
Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note 15, at 31 ("[I]f and when [the Court
requires states to recognize same-sex marriages], it will be following public opinion, not
leading it. Political and social change was a precondition for Lawrence, whose future
reach will depend on the nature and extent of that change.").
" See Hunter, supra note 12, at 1123 (arguing the "current line of privacy
cases will remain essentially undisturbed").
339 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 961 (Mass.
2003).
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substantive due process would be at best a locked steering
wheel, but not a pair of handcuffs.
Nonetheless, there is currently reason for those who
value a strong substantive due process to be cautious, if not
pessimistic. Professor Cass Sunstein expected Lawrence to
demand a protected right to use sexual devices.340
The
Eleventh Circuit disagreed.341 To have emerging rights finally
recognized, and to not retreat any ground thus far gained,
substantive due process should be argued to-and ultimately
read to-explicitly demand inquiry into current reasonable
societal reliances.342
Brandon R. Johnsont

340

Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold?, supra note

15, at 73

('The

Constitution probably forbids government from punishing, either criminally or civilly,
those who have used sexual devices.").
341 Williams v. Att'y Gen. of Ala., 378 F.3d 1232, 1250 (11th Cir. 2004).
342 See Post, supra note 10, at 8, 11.
I Brooklyn Law School, Class of 2006, with much thanks and praise to
Brooklyn Law Review.

